Iran Is Run by a Board of IRGC Generals — Khamenei Not Seen Since March

The New York Times reported on April 23, 2026 that Mojtaba Khamenei — Iran's new Supreme Leader — governs through a "board of directors" model, delegating operational decision-making to a triangle of IRGC generals: Hossein Taeb (former IRGC Intelligence chief), Mohsen Rezaei (former IRGC commander-in-chief), and Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf (Parliament Speaker, former IRGC commander). Mojtaba has not been seen publicly since his appointment following his father's death. He communicates via handwritten notes. Access to him is described as "extremely difficult."

This is not a government with a functioning Supreme Leader in any conventional sense. It is a committee of IRGC generals making decisions in the name of a Supreme Leader who is not publicly visible. For the Iran-US ceasefire negotiation, the Hormuz shipping lanes, and every downstream effect on oil markets and cloud infrastructure, understanding who is actually in the room when Iran makes decisions has never mattered more.

The Triangle of Power: Taeb, Rezaei, Ghalibaf

The three generals identified in the NYT reporting as Mojtaba's operational board represent different segments of the IRGC and Iranian power structure:

Hossein Taeb: Former head of IRGC Intelligence (IRGC-IO), the IRGC's internal security and foreign intelligence directorate. Taeb ran IRGC-IO from 2009 to 2022 — the period that included the Green Movement suppression, the assassination programme against Iranian nuclear scientists, and the expansion of IRGC cyber operations. He was replaced as IRGC-IO chief in 2022 but remained within the IRGC power structure. His inclusion in Mojtaba's board signals that intelligence operations — cyber, covert action, proxy management — are represented at the highest decision level.

Mohsen Rezaei: Former IRGC commander-in-chief (1981-1997), now Secretary of the Expediency Council. Rezaei is the elder statesman of the IRGC old guard — he commanded the IRGC during the Iran-Iraq war and has been a power centre in Iranian politics for four decades. His presence on the board gives it institutional continuity with the IRGC's founding generation. Rezaei has historically been pragmatic relative to IRGC hardliners — he has run for president four times, demonstrating a willingness to engage civilian political processes.

Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf: Parliament Speaker, former mayor of Tehran, and former IRGC Air Force commander. Ghalibaf is the only one of the three with a current elected civilian position. His dual role — publicly the head of Iran's parliament, privately one of three generals running the country through Mojtaba's board — resolves the apparent contradiction between his public "surrender" statements about ceasefire talks and the US intelligence assessment that he privately favours a deal. Ghalibaf is not hiding his IRGC alignment. It is the explicit structure.

What "Board of Directors" Government Actually Means

The board model described in the NYT reporting is not a formal constitutional structure. Iran's constitution provides for the Supreme Leader as the ultimate authority — a single individual, not a committee. Mojtaba's board governance is a workaround for the legitimacy problem: a Supreme Leader who cannot appear publicly cannot issue the kind of authoritative, publicly attributed directives that the constitution gives the Supreme Leader.

The board substitutes collective IRGC authority for individual Supreme Leader authority. Decisions are made by the three generals, attributed to "the Supreme Leader's guidance," and implemented through the appropriate government channels. The fiction of Supreme Leader governance is maintained while the reality is collective IRGC decision-making.

This structure has specific implications for how decisions get made and unmade:

Consensus requirement: A board of three generals requires at least two of three to agree on significant decisions. If Taeb (intelligence/covert action orientation) and Rezaei (pragmatic elder statesman) disagree, Ghalibaf's vote determines the outcome. If all three have different preferences, no decision is made — which explains the observed paralysis in the ceasefire-to-deal transition.

Reversibility: Board decisions can be reversed if the composition changes or if consensus breaks down. Unlike a Supreme Leader directive — which carries religious and constitutional weight that makes reversal face-costly — a board decision is more politically reversible. IRGC ship seizures on the day of the ceasefire extension (April 22) and Mohammadi's "ceasefire has no meaning" statement are consistent with either Taeb or a hardliner aligned with Taeb winning a specific board argument that day.

Accountability diffusion: When things go wrong, a board has no single accountable figure. The "Supreme Leader" is responsible in theory, but the invisible, publicly absent Mojtaba cannot be held accountable in practice. The three generals face no public accountability for the consequences of their decisions.

Handwritten Notes: The Security Rationale

The NYT reporting that Mojtaba communicates via handwritten notes is consistent with a specific intelligence security rationale. Every electronic communication channel — phone calls, encrypted messaging apps, email — is potentially compromised by NSA signals intelligence collection. Israel's Unit 8200 and the CIA have demonstrated the ability to intercept encrypted communications from senior Iranian officials through a combination of endpoint compromise and network interception.

Handwritten notes on physical paper are not interceptable by electronic signals intelligence. They can only be obtained by physically accessing the note, which requires either a human intelligence asset with direct physical access (a penetration that is extremely difficult to maintain against the IRGC's internal security apparatus) or photographic surveillance that would require close-range physical access.

The handwritten notes protocol, combined with the "extremely difficult" access description, suggests Mojtaba is operating from a secure location with physical security that compensates for his public invisibility. The US and Israeli intelligence communities almost certainly know his general location through signals collection on the people around him — but his own communications remain dark in a way that senior officials who use electronic channels are not.

This protocol matters for the ceasefire negotiation: there is no phone line to Mojtaba. There is no back-channel that reaches him directly. Any communication with Iran's effective decision-making authority goes through the three generals, each of whom has his own interests and prefers his own outcomes.

The Ceasefire Implication: Who Is Actually Negotiating

The back-channel that produced Trump's ceasefire extension on April 22 ran through Pakistan's Field Marshal Munir to Araghchi's foreign ministry contacts. That channel reaches the civilian track of Iranian governance — the foreign ministry, which reports to President Pezeshkian, who was elected by the Iranian people and has a mandate for diplomacy.

But the NYT's board-of-generals reporting suggests Pezeshkian's foreign ministry is not where the actual decisions are made. The civilian government exists as a constitutional shell. The board of IRGC generals makes the decisions that matter — on Hormuz, on ship seizures, on ceasefire terms, on nuclear negotiations.

This means the back-channel that works for ceasefire extensions is not the back-channel that can produce a binding deal. Araghchi can signal flexibility. He cannot commit Iran to an agreement that the board of generals has not approved. And there is currently no direct channel to the board — not through Pakistan, not through Oman, not through any of the mediation routes that have been active.

Trump's "unified proposal" condition requires a proposal that all Iranian factions agree on. The NYT reporting reveals the faction structure more precisely: it is not "civilian vs IRGC" — it is "the board of three IRGC generals" whose collective decision is the only decision that counts.

The Oil and Infrastructure Consequence

The board-of-generals governance structure changes the forecast for Hormuz and oil markets in a specific direction:

Deal timeline extends further: Getting a unified proposal requires all three generals to agree. Taeb (intelligence/covert operations background) is structurally less inclined toward a deal that reduces IRGC operational autonomy. Rezaei (elder statesman, pragmatic) is more open to it. Ghalibaf's position is determined by which of these two he aligns with in the board dynamic — and his public statements ("surrender") suggest he is not in a rush to break with the hardliner posture publicly.

Ship seizures continue: The April 22 IRGC ship seizures on the same day as the ceasefire extension demonstrate that the board authorised or accepted operational actions that contradict the ceasefire framework. This is not a one-time event — it is the board's governance style.

Cyber operations remain authorised: Iran's military target declaration against AWS, Google, and Microsoft data centres was issued through IRGC-aligned channels. With Taeb (former IRGC-IO chief, who oversaw IRGC cyber operations) on the board, cyber operation authorisation is likely maintained or expanding.

Key Takeaways

• NYT reports April 23: Mojtaba Khamenei governs through a "board of directors" of three IRGC generals — Hossein Taeb (former IRGC Intelligence chief), Mohsen Rezaei (former IRGC commander, Expediency Council), Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf (Parliament Speaker, IRGC background)
• Mojtaba not seen publicly since March: communicates via handwritten notes only; access described as "extremely difficult" — the electronic communications dark protocol indicates extreme OPSEC awareness
• Board governance creates consensus requirement: decisions require at least 2 of 3 generals to agree; explains observed paralysis on ceasefire-to-deal transition and the contradictory signals (back-channel deal signals + ship seizures on same day)
• Ceasefire back-channel reaches Araghchi, not the board: the Pakistan-mediated channel connects to civilian foreign ministry, which does not have decision authority over Hormuz, ship seizures, or nuclear deal terms — those decisions go to the board
• Trump's "unified proposal" condition requires board consensus: not civilian + IRGC, but all three generals specifically; Taeb's covert operations background makes him structurally the hardest to move
• Infrastructure consequence: deal timeline extends, ship seizures continue as board-authorised operations, IRGC cyber operations authorisation maintained with Taeb on board

For the earlier Mojtaba analysis, read Mojtaba Khamenei's Silence Is Iran's Negotiating Position. For the IRGC ship seizures the board authorised, read IRGC Seizes Two Ships in Hormuz Hours After Trump Extends Ceasefire. For the fractured government context, read Iran's Fractured Government: Mojtaba Khamenei, IRGC vs Civilians Explained.