Governments Are Trying to Break Encryption in 2026 — Here's What Developers Must Do

2026 has brought a new wave of government pressure on encrypted messaging. The UK's Online Safety Act, the EU's proposed Chat Control regulation, India's IT Rules, and several other national frameworks all share a common demand: law enforcement needs access to private encrypted communications. The specific mechanism varies — backdoors, client-side scanning, "lawful access" interfaces — but the intent is the same. For developers building apps with encryption, private messaging, or user data that could be subject to these regimes, understanding the landscape is now a compliance requirement, not just an academic interest.

## The Current Legal Landscape

**United Kingdom — Online Safety Act**: Passed in 2023, in force and increasingly enforced in 2026. The Act gives Ofcom the power to require platforms to scan private messages for illegal content, including content protected by end-to-end encryption. Signal and WhatsApp both stated publicly they would rather leave the UK market than compromise encryption. As of early 2026, Ofcom has not yet issued a direct scanning order to a major messaging platform, but the legal authority exists and regulatory pressure is building.

**European Union — Chat Control**: The EU's proposed Chat Control regulation would require platforms to scan private messages (including encrypted content) for child sexual abuse material (CSAM) and terrorism content. The proposal has stalled multiple times due to strong opposition from EU member states (particularly Germany) and civil liberties organisations. As of March 2026, it has not passed, but it remains on the legislative agenda. The EU's Digital Services Act (DSA) already imposes significant obligations on large platforms.

**India**: India's IT (Intermediary Guidelines and Digital Media Ethics Code) Rules 2021 require "significant social media intermediaries" to enable identification of the "first originator" of messages upon government request — effectively a backdoor into encrypted group messaging. WhatsApp has challenged this in Indian courts. The case has been ongoing since 2021 with no final resolution as of 2026.

**United States**: The US Congress has repeatedly considered EARN IT Act provisions that would create liability for platforms offering encryption. As of 2026, no mandatory encryption backdoor law has passed federally, but the legal landscape under the Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA) and Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) continues to allow broad government access to metadata and unencrypted stored data.

**Australia**: The Assistance and Access Act (2018) already allows Australian authorities to request technical assistance from providers — including compelling companies to modify products to enable access. This is one of the most far-reaching existing laws.

## Why Backdoors Don't Work Technically

This point needs to be stated clearly because it is often lost in policy debates: **a cryptographic backdoor accessible to one government is accessible to all adversaries who find it**.

End-to-end encryption works by ensuring that only the communicating parties hold the keys. A backdoor requires either:
1. **A third party key escrow** — a master key held by the platform or government that can decrypt any message. This key becomes the highest-value target for every nation-state hacker, criminal, and intelligence agency on earth. Protecting it is an unsolved problem.
2. **Client-side scanning** — scanning the content on the device before it is encrypted, then reporting to a server. This is not technically a backdoor in the encryption, but it is functionally the same from a privacy standpoint: a third party sees your messages before you send them.

Both approaches have the same fundamental problem: they weaken the security of the entire system to enable access for *intended* authorities, but that same weakness is exploitable by *unintended* adversaries. The cryptographic community is essentially unanimous on this — there is no mathematically sound way to build "secure but accessible" encryption.

The practical result: many of the developers and security experts who built these systems would rather remove the product from a jurisdiction than compromise the underlying security for all users globally.

## What This Means for Developers

**If you are building a messaging or communication product:**

- Understand which jurisdictions your users are in and what legal obligations apply. UK, AU, and IN have the most aggressive existing frameworks; EU Chat Control remains a risk.
- Do not build a backdoor proactively — it creates liability and risk in every jurisdiction that *does* protect encryption. Build for strong encryption first; respond to specific legal orders as they come with proper legal counsel.
- Consider your architecture: server-side key storage is a liability in strong-privacy jurisdictions and a legal risk in backdoor-demanding ones. Client-side key management (device-only keys) is the more defensible design.
- Store as little as possible. The data you do not have cannot be compelled from you. Minimise metadata retention.

**If you handle sensitive user data generally:**

- GDPR (EU), CPRA (California), and many other privacy laws require data minimisation, purpose limitation, and technical measures to protect personal data. Strong encryption is not just ethically correct — it is legally required in many jurisdictions.
- Understand the difference between encryption at rest, in transit, and end-to-end. Many "encrypted" products only offer at-rest encryption (protecting against physical theft or data breaches), not end-to-end (protecting against the platform operator).
- Be transparent with users about what you can and cannot access. Users in high-risk regions (journalists, activists, lawyers, medical professionals) make security decisions based on these representations.

**If you are a developer personally:**

Use Signal for sensitive communications. Signal is open source, its security model is independently audited, and it holds no message content. Use WhatsApp for convenience (it uses the Signal protocol for message encryption, but is owned by Meta which retains metadata). Use iMessage for Apple device-to-device communication (end-to-end encrypted). Avoid SMS for anything sensitive — it is not encrypted.

## Signal's Position in 2026

Signal Foundation has been unambiguous: they will withdraw from a jurisdiction rather than compromise their encryption model. When the UK Online Safety Act threatened mandatory scanning, Signal's CEO stated that Signal would leave the UK market. As of early 2026, Signal is still available in the UK — Ofcom has not issued a scanning order to Signal directly — but the tension remains.

Signal is also a reference implementation for the rest of the industry. The Signal Protocol underlies WhatsApp, Signal, and many other apps. If Signal's protocol is ever legally compelled to include a backdoor, the implications ripple across the entire messaging ecosystem.

## The Developer Community's Role

Developers are not passive observers here. Encryption policy is shaped partly by technical testimony, advocacy, and the actual choices developers make when building products. The Electronic Frontier Foundation, Access Now, and Open Rights Group all advocate for strong encryption in policy processes and welcome technical input.

At a minimum: understand the laws in your users' jurisdictions, build with the strongest technically feasible privacy protections, minimise data retention, and engage with policy processes that affect your product. The weakening of encryption affects not just messaging apps but the entire infrastructure of trust that underpins e-commerce, healthcare, finance, and everything else that moves over the internet.